Da fragt man sich - wer ist da überhaupt dagegen?

Ich denke diese Frage kann man leicht statistisch mit einer kleinen Stichprobenumfrage beantworten.

Ich vermute mal, es sind nur die dagegen, die ein Duell ohne Waffel-Gleichheit nicht scheuen.
Wie sagt man so schön, wir haben eine an der Waffel.

Die EZB ist auch nicht dagegen:

ECB simulations demonstrate that a strict risk parity rule would have called for a large unwinding of leveraged investments when cross-asset correlations surged earlier this year (see left chart slide 8). As volatility spiked and diversification benefits from cross-asset exposures vanished, volatility-targeting investors were prompted to sell assets and reduce leverage (see right chart slide 8).

The new portfolio would have had a cash share of nearly 25% as a result. Notably, asset sales would have extended to all asset classes in the portfolio, including the supposedly safer ones, in line with what we observed in the spring.
Margin calls and demand for liquidity

The third factor relates to margin calls.

Margining requirements are an important safeguard to reduce counterparty credit risk. But they also increase liquidity risk, particularly when liquid asset holdings are inadequate.

Initial and variation margins collected by four European central counterparties together increased by around €60 billion during the peak of the crisis (see left chart slide 9). Total variation margins posted by euro area investment funds rose more than fivefold over the same period and exceeded pre-pandemic cash positions for more than one-quarter of funds with derivative exposures.

To meet margin calls, some euro area insurers and pension funds that make extensive use of interest rate swaps and foreign exchange derivatives liquidated shares held in money market funds (MMFs). There was a striking correlation between margin calls and MMF

Viele Grüße
amos