Entwichene Viren

Laborentweichungen und „sich selbst erfüllende Prophezeiungs“-Epidemien

Von: Dr. Martin Furmanski

Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgruppe zu chemischen und biologischen Waffen - Zentrum für Rüstungskontrolle und Nichtverbreitung

17. Februar 2014

Einleitung
Die Gefahr für die weltweite oder regionale öffentliche Gesundheit, die von der Freisetzung potenziell pandemiefähiger Krankheitserreger (PPKs) aus mikrobiologischen Laboratorien ausgeht, ist Gegenstand erheblicher Diskussionen [1,2,3,4], einschließlich mathematischer Modellierung der Wahrscheinlichkeit und der Auswirkungen solcher Freisetzungen [5]. Das Risiko solcher Freisetzungen wird im Allgemeinen anhand von Schätzungen von Laborinfektionen ermittelt, die häufig unvollständig sind, mit Ausnahme des jüngsten Berichts des Centers for Disease Control (CDC) aus dem Jahr 2013 [6], der eine wichtige Quelle für aktuelle Daten über Entweichungen von nicht erkannten und nicht gemeldeten laborbedingten Infektionen (LBIs) darstellt.

In diesem Papier wird ein historischer Überblick über Ausbrüche von PPKs oder ähnlich übertragbaren Krankheitserregern gegeben, die in vermutlich gut finanzierten und überwachten, staatlich unterstützten Labors aufgetreten sind. Es sollte betont werden, dass diese Beispiele nur die „Spitze des Eisbergs“ darstellen, da es sich um Laborunfälle handelt, die tatsächlich außerhalb des Labors in der allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit Krankheiten verursacht haben. Die Liste der Labormitarbeiter, die sich in mikrobiologischen Labors mit potenziell ansteckenden Infektionen angesteckt haben, ohne dass es zu Ausbrüchen in der Bevölkerung kam, ist viel, viel länger. Bei den hier aufgeführten Beispielen handelt es sich nicht nur um „Beinaheunfälle“, sondern um Ausbrüche in der realen Welt.

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